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Abstract
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceiv-
ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from phys-
ical truths (cf. Chalmers, 1996; 2010) in light of a hyperintensional reg-
imentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demon-
strates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness
and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when
the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possi-
bility – thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical
significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
This paper argues that Chalmers’s (1996; 2010) two-dimensional conceiv-
ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical
truths risks being obviated by a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology
of consciousness.1
Chalmers (2010) provides the following argument against the identification
of phenomenal truths with physical and functional truths. Let M be a model
comprised of a domain D of formulas; C a set of epistemic possibilities; W a
set of metaphysical possibilities; Rc and Rw, accessibility relations on C and
W, respectively; and V a valuation function assigning formulas to subsets of
C and W. So, M = 〈D,C,W,Rc,Rw,V〉. Let P denote the subset of formulas
in the domain concerning fundamental physics, as well as both neurofunctional
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properties such as oscillations of neural populations, and psychofunctional prop-
erties such as the retrieval of information from memory stores. Let Q denote
the subset of formulas in the domain concerning phenomenal consciousness. A
formula is epistemically necessary or apriori (), if and only if it has the same
value at all points in C, if and only if it is impossible, i.e. inconceivable, for
the formula to have a variant value (¬⋄¬). A formula is negatively conceivable
(⋄) if and only if nothing rules it out apriori (¬¬) (144). A formula is meta-
physically necessary if and only if it has the same value at all points in W. A
formula is said to be ‘super-rigid’, if and only if it is both epistemically and
metaphysically necessary, and thus has the same value at all points in epistemic
and metaphysical modal space (2012: 474).
The physicalist thesis states that:
P → Q.
Suppose, however, that the physicalist thesis is false. Thus,
1. ¬(P → Q).
By the definition of the material conditional,
2. ¬(¬P ∨ Q).
By the De Morgan rules for negation,
3. ¬¬P ∧ ¬Q.
By double negation elimination,
4. P ∧ ¬Q.2
The two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism proceeds
as follows. ‘P ∧ ¬Q’ can receive a truth value relative to two parameters, a
context, C, and an index, W. In multi-dimensional intensional semantics, the
2For the formal equivalence, given the definition of the material conditional, see Chalmers
(2010: 169).
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value of the formula relative to the context determines the value of the formula
relative to the index. Let the context range over a space of epistemic possibilities
and let the index range over a space of metaphysical possibilities. Then,
JP ∧ ¬QKc,w = 1 iff ∃c’∈C∃w’∈WJP ∧ ¬QKc
′,w′ = 1.3
The foregoing clause codifies the thought that, if it is epistemically possi-
ble that the truths about physics and functional organization obtain while the
truths about consciousness do not, then the dissociation between P and Q is
metaphysically possible as well. The argument depends on the assumption that
propositions about consciousness and physics are super-rigid, such that the epis-
temic possibility concerning such truths can serve as a guide to the metaphysical
possibility thereof.
If the conceivability argument is sound, then the physicalist thesis – that all
phenomenal truths are derivable from physical and functional truths – is possibly
false. The foregoing argument entrains, thereby, the metaphysical possibility
of a property-based version of dualism between phenomenal consciousness and
fundamental physics.
One of the standard responses to Chalmers’s conceivability argument is to
endeavor to argue that there are ‘strong’ necessities, i.e. cases according to which
the necessity of the physical and phenomenal formulas throughout epistemic and
metaphysical modal space is yet consistent with the epistemic possibility that
the formulas have a different value.4 Note, however, that strong necessities are
3For the clause for the two-dimensional intension, see Chalmers and Rabern (2014: 211-
212). Chalmers’ informal characterization of the argument proceeds as follows:
1. P ∧ ¬Q is conceivable.
2. If P ∧ ¬Q is conceivable, P ∧ ¬Q is [epistemically, i.e.] 1-possible.
3. If P ∧ ¬Q is 1-possible, P ∧ ¬Q is [metaphysically, i.e.] 2-possible.
4. If P ∧ ¬Q is 2-possible, then materialism is false.
Thus,
5. Materialism is false (2010: 149).
4As Chalmers (2010: 166-167) writes, ‘Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify [the general
conceivability-possibility thesis] CP by making clear what a counterexample to it would involve
. . . Let us say that a negative strong necessity is a statement S such that S is [epistemically]-
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ruled-out, just if one accepts the normal duality axioms for the modal operators:
i.e., it is necessary that φ if and only if it is impossible for φ to be false: φ iff
¬⋄¬φ. Thus, the epistemic necessity of φ rules out the epistemic possibility of
not-φ by fiat. So, proponents of the strong necessity strategy are committed to
a revision of the classical duality axioms.
Another line of counter-argument proceeds by suggesting that the formulas
and terms at issue are not super-rigid. Against the super-rigidity of physi-
cal truths, one might argue, for example, that our knowledge of fundamental
physics is incomplete, such that there might be newly discovered phenomenal
or proto-phenomenal truths in physical theories from which the truths about
consciousness might be derived.5 More contentiously, the epistemic profile of
consciousness – as recorded by the concepts comprising our thoughts thereof,
or by the appearance of its instantiation – might be dissociable from its ac-
tual instantiation. A variation on this reply takes our concepts of phenomenal
consciousness still to refer to physical properties (cf. Block, 2006). A related
line of counter-argument relies on the assumption that phenomenal concepts are
entities which are themselves physically reducible (cf. Balog, 1999).
Finally, a counter-argument to the conceivability argument that has yet to
be advanced in the literature is that its underlying logic might be non-classical.
Thus, for example – by relying on double negation elimination in the inference
necessary and [metaphysically]-necessary but ¬S is negatively conceivable’. For a case-by-case
examination of purported examples of strong necessities, see Chalmers (op. cit.: 170-184;
2014). Because it is epistemically possible for there to be scenarios in which there is no
consciousness, the target neighborhood of epistemically possible worlds is that in which the
conditions on there being phenomenal consciousness are assumed to obtain. [Thanks here to
Chalmers (p.c.).] Thus, the notion of epistemic necessity will satisfy conditions on real world
validity, rather than general validity. In the latter case, a formula is necessary if and only if it
has the same value in all worlds in a model. In the former case, the necessity at issue will hold
throughout the neighborhood, where a neighborhood function assigns the subset of worlds in
which consciousness obtains to a privileged world in the model.
5See Seager (1995) and Strawson (2006) for the panpsychist proposal. Proponents of the
pan-protopsychist approach include Stoljar (2001, 2014) and Montero (2010).
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from line 3 to 4 above – the equivalence between ’¬(P → Q)’ and ’P ∧ ¬Q’
is intuitionistically invalid. A novel approach might further consist in arguing
that epistemic modality might be governed by the Routley-Meyer semantics for
relevant logic.6 Relevant validity can be defined via a ternary relation, such
that Jφ → ψKα = 1 iff JφKβ ≤ JψKγ and R(α,β,γ), where the parameters, α, β,
and γ, range over epistemic possibilities. Then the irrelevant entailment, φ ∧
¬φ → ψ, can be avoided by setting JφKβ = 1; JφKγ = 0; JψKβ = 0; while JψKγ =
1. So, JφKβ = 1; JφKγ = 0; and JψKβ = 0. The philosophical interest of relevant
logic is that it eschews the principle of disjunctive syllogism; i.e., ∀φ,ψ[[(φ ∨
ψ) ∧ ¬φ] → ψ] iff ∀φ,ψ[[φ ∧ (¬φ ∨ ψ)] → ψ]. Without disjunctive syllogism,
logical entailment can no longer be identified with the material conditional, and
this would block the derivation of line 2 from line 1 in the formal equivalence
between ’¬(P → Q)’ and ’P ∧ ¬Q’.
In this essay, I will pursue a line of argument which is novel and distinct
from the foregoing. I argue, in turn, that the conceivability argument can
be circumvented, when the relationship between the truths about fundamental
physics and the truths about phenomenal consciousness is analyzed in a classical,
hyperintensional setting. Suppose, for example, that the physicalist thesis is
defined using hyperintensional, grounding operators rather than metaphysical
necessitation.7 Then, the epistemic and metaphysical possibility that ¬(P→ Q)
is classically valid, although targets a less fine-grained metaphysical connection
between physical and phenomenal truths. Even if P’s grounding Q still entails
the metaphysical necessitation of Q by P, the epistemic-intensional value of ‘¬(P
→ Q)’ – will be an insufficient guide to the metaphysical-hyperintensional value
of the proposition. So, even if the intension for ‘consciousness’ is rigid in both
6Cf. Routley and Meyer (1972,a,b; 1973).
7For the logic and operator-based semantics for the notion of explanatory ground, see Fine
(2012,a; 2012,b).
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epistemic and metaphysical modal space, the epistemic intension recording the
value of the proposition will be blind to its actual metaphysical value, because
the latter will be hyperintensional.
In the remainder of this essay, I will outline the regimentation of the propos-
als in the ontology of consciousness using hyperintensional grounding operators,
rather than the resources of modality and identity.8 By contrast to the modal
approach underlying the conceivability argument, the hyperintensional regimen-
tation targets the properties of reflexivity and bijective mappings, in order to
countenance novel, ontological dependence relations between the properties of
consciousness and physics, which are finer-grained than necessitation.9
Following Fine (2012a; 2012b), let a polyadic operator have a ground-theoretic
interpretation, only if the profile induced by the interpretation concerns the hy-
perintensional truth-making connection between an antecedent set of truths or
properties and the relevant consequent. Let a grounding operator be weak if
and only if it induces reflexive grounding; i.e., if and only if it is sufficient for
the provision of its own ground. A grounding operator is strict if and only if it
is not weak. A grounding operator is full if and only if it uniquely provides the
explanatory ground for a fact. A grounding operator is part if and only if it -
along with other facts - provide the explanatory ground for a fusion of facts.
Combinations of the foregoing explanatory operators may also obtain: x <
y iff φ is a strict full ground for ψ; x ≤ y iff φ is a weak full ground for ψ; x ≺
y iff φ is a strict part ground for ψ; x  y iff φ is a weak part ground for ψ; x
 y ∧ ¬(y  x) iff φ is a strict partial ground for ψ; x ≺* y iff x1, ..., xn ≤ y,
8Cf. Khudairi (ms), for the regimentation and for further discussion.
9The claim that necessitation must be present in cases in which there is grounding is open
to counterexample. Because, e.g., hyperintensional dependencies can obtain in only parts
of, rather than entirely within, a world, the hyperintensional dependencies need not reflect
necessitation. For further discussion of the grounding-necessitation thesis, see Rosen (2010)
and Skiles (2015).
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iff φ is a partial strict ground for ψ; x ≺’ z iff [φ ≺* ψ ∧ ψ  µ] iff φ is a part
strict ground for some further fact, µ.10
The proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness can then be regimented
in the hyperintensional framework as follows.
• Functionalism (modally: truths about consciousness are identical to truths
about neuro- or psychofunctional role):
Functional truths (F) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only
if the grounding operator is:
-strict full, s.t. F < Q
-distributive (i.e. bijective between each truth-ground and grounded truth),
s.t. ∃f1−1〈F, Q〉
• Phenomenal Realist Type Identity (modally: truths about consciousness
are identical to truths about biological properties, yet phenomenal prop-
erties are – in some sense – non-reductively real).11
10The derivation is induced by the following proof-rules:
• Subsumption
(<, ≤):
[(x1, . . . , xn < y)] → (x ≤ y)
(<, ≺):
[(x1, . . . xn) < y] → (x ≺ y)
(≺, ):
(x ≺ y) → (x  y)
(≤, ):
(x ≤ y) → (x  y)
• Distributivity/Bijection:
∀x∈X, y∈Y
[G[(. . . x . . . )(. . . y . . . )], s.t.
f1−1: [x1 → y1], . . . , f1−1: [xn → yn]].
11See, e.g., Smart (1959: 148-149), for an attempt to account for how phenomenal properties
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Biological truths (B) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only if
the grounding operator is:
-strict partial, s.t. B  Q ∧ ¬ Q  B;
-distributive, s.t. ∃f1−1〈B, Q〉; and
-truths about consciousness are weak part (i.e. the set partly reflexively
grounds itself), s.t. Q  Q
• Property Dualism (modally: truths about consciousness are identical nei-
ther to functional nor biological truths, yet are necessitated by physical
truths):
Physical truths (P) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only if
the grounding operator is:
-P  Q;
-non-distributive, s.t. ¬∃f1−1〈P, Q〉; and
-truths about consciousness are weak part, s.t. Q  Q
• Panpsychism (in Non-constitutive guise: Phenomenal properties are the
intrinsic realizers of extrinsic functional properties and their roles; in
Constitutive guise: (i) fundamental microphysical entities are function-
ally specified and they instantiate microphenomenal properties, where
microphenomenal properties are the realizers of the fundamental micro-
physical entity’s role/functional specification; and (ii) microphenomenal
properties constitute the macrophenomenal properties of macrophysical
entities):
and biological properties can be identical, while phenomenal properties might yet have distinct
higher-order properties.
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Truths about consciousness (Q) ground truths about functional role (F)
if and only if the grounding operator is:
-strict full, s.t. Q < F; and
-non-distributive, s.t. ¬∃f1−1〈Q, F〉
The philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation of the
ontology of consciousness is at least three-fold. First, the regimentation permits
one coherently to formulate Phenomenal Realist Type Identity. Leibniz’s law
states that for all propositional variables x,y and for all properties R, x = y iff
(Rx ⇐⇒ Ry). According to the Phenomenal Realist Type Identity proposal,
phenomenal properties are identicial to biological properties, while phenomenal
properties are in some sense non-reductively real. Thus, in the modal setting,
Phenomenal Realist Type Identity belies Leibniz’s law, on the assumption that
the latter can be applied to intensional entities. One virtue of the hyperinten-
sional regimentation is thus that it avoids this result, by providing a framework
with the expressive resources sufficient to formulate the non-reductive Type
Identity proposal.
Second, the hyperintensional grounding regimentation evinces how function-
alist approaches to the ontology of consciousness can be explanatory, because
the identification of phenomenal properties with functional organization can be
defined via the foregoing ground-theoretic explanatory properties. Block (2015)
suggests that – by contrast to Phenomenal Realist Type Identity – identify-
ing phenomenal properties with functional roles cannot sufficiently account for
the ground-theoretic explanation of the identity. Block distinguishes between
metaphysical and ontological versions of physicalism. Block’s ‘ontological phys-
icalism’ is a reductive, functionalist theory, and eschews of explanation by re-
stricting the remit of its theory to ‘what there is’; i.e. to specifying identity
9
statements between entities in the domain of quantification (114). By contrast,
Block’s ‘metaphysical physicalism’ – namely, Phenomenal Realist Type Identity
– purports to account for the nature of the entities figuring in theoretical iden-
tity statements via availing of relations of explanatory, ontological dependence
(op. cit.).
Block poses the following consideration against the functionalist (115-117).
Suppose that there is a counterpart of a human organism with isomorphic func-
tional properties, but comprised of distinct biological properties. Suppose that
the functional isomorph instantiates phenomenal properties. Block argues that
the functional isomorph ‘is like us superficially, but not in any deep property
that can plausibly be one that scientists will one day tell us is the physical
ground of consciousness [. . . ] So there is a key question that that kind of re-
ductive physicalism – ontological physicalism – does not ask nor answer: what
is it that creatures with the same phenomenology share that grounds that phe-
nomenology’ (op. cit.)? The foregoing does not provide an argument that the
neuro- and psycho-functionalist must provide an account of in virtue of what
phenomenal properties are instantiated. Rather, Block suggests only that func-
tionalist proposals do not sufficiently inquire into the realizers of the functional
roles that they specify. He suggests that this theoretical approach would be in-
sufficient, if one were to seek an explanation of the psychofunctional correlations
between phenomenal property types and the relevant functional roles.
The second theoretical virtue of the hyperintensional regimentation is thus
that it demonstrates how Block’s analysis might be circumvented. Function-
alism can be regimented within the logic of hyperintensional ground; and can
therefore satisfy the formal requirements on explaining in virtue of what phe-
nomenal truths ontologically depend upon functional truths [cf. Khudairi (op.
10
cit.)].12
Third, and most crucially: The regimentation demonstrates how metaphys-
ically possible relations between consciousness and physics cannot be witnessed
by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e.,
the epistemic possibility – thereof. Propositional epistemic modality is blind to
the hyperintensional, metaphysical dependencies holding between phenomenal
and physical truths. Thus, the two-dimensional conceivability argument against
the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths risks being obviated
by a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness.
12Of pertinence to the foregoing is another distinction drawn by Fine (2015,a), between
material and criterial identity conditions. While material identity conditions imply the identity
of the objects in question, criterial identity conditions explain in virtue of what the objects
in question are the same. In order to countenance criterial identity conditions, Fine avails of
his earlier work on arbitrary objects (2015,b: 305; cf. Fine, 1985). Let a model, M , for a
first-order language, L, be a tuple, where M = 〈I, A, R, V 〉, with I a domain of concrete and
abstract individuals, A a domain of arbitrary objects, R a dependence relation on arbitrary
objects, and V a non-empty set of partial functions from A to I (cf. Fine, 1985). The arbitrary
objects in A can be conceived of as reified variables, and the dependence relation between any
a and b in A may be interpreted as a relation of ontological dependence (op. cit.: 59-60). A
criterial identity condition for, e.g., sets, can then be stated as follows: Given arbitrary x,y,
with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) →x,y (x = y)]. (Intuitively: Given arbitrary objects,
x, y, whose values are sets, the fact that x and y share the same members grounds the fact
that they are the same.) A crucial point of departure between the foregoing and the approach
proffered in this essay is Fine’s ontology of arbitrary objects, to which the present proposal
need make no appeal.
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